ON JOHN RAWLS'S TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE : Their theoretical development by Toya, Ryoji
Title ON JOHN RAWLS'S TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE :Their theoretical development
Author(s)Toya, Ryoji




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
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   John Rawls is Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. He has de-
voted his scholary career over thirty years exclusively to studies of theoretical 
problems of social justice. His major work, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (hence-
forth TJ), appeared in 1971. Because of its quality of originality and of 
throughness, TJ has aroused wide and lively debates among philosophers, econo-
mists and other social scientists since then. TJ is surely the touch stone for 
contemporary discussions in this area of investigation. 
   But it is no easy task to have a full understanding of TJ, for it deals a wide 
variety of topics, from various arguments for basic principles to their application 
to politics and social problems. Also, discussions and arguments it includess are 
quite complicated, sometimes not clear, and often seem to be inconsistent. TJ 
is not so systematized or unified as Rawls intends to be. 
   However, the central point to his theory is very much clear, that is, to con-
struct and justify the two principles of justice under the "original position", 
a hypothetical contractarian situation of choice. This fundamental idea has been 
held consistently since 1958 article "JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS" (henceforth 
JF), in which the two principles of justice received their first formulation. A 
dozen years between JF and TJ were spent on amending ordeepening his theory 
to meet objections and criticisms to the first formulation of the two principles in 
JF. Complexities mentioned above in TJ can be seen as a result of this theo-
retical development which Rawls had to embark on. 
   So, my aim in this paper is, first, to compare the first formulation of the 
two principles of justice in JF with the final one in TJ and to trace the course 
Rawls took to make his theory more plausible; and second, to examine two cru-
cial notions Rawls introduced in the later version of his theory; namely, the 
notion of "the veil of ignorance" and that of "the difference principle". I hope 
this brief survey will be of some help for grasping the heart of his theory.
I BACKGROUND
Before proceeding the main issue, I will take a glance at the historical-
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theoretical background from which Rawls began with his problem. 
   In his preface to TJ, in explaining his aim and intention, Rawls mentions 
utilitarianism and intuitionism as two major rival schools of normative ethical 
theory which have been dominant in modern Anglo-American ethics, and says, 
"The outcome is that we often seem forced to choose between utilitarianism 
and intuitionism".a But, for him this choice is dilemmatic; each of them has 







can enunciate a rational rule or procedure for settling ethical 
disputes because of its teleological nature with one ultimate 
standard, e. g. the principles of utility that defines the good 
as satisfaction of (rational) desire. 
cannot explain fully our common convictions concerning the 
priority of justice, for it defines the right as maximizing the 
good and thus subordinates the former to the latter.
(interpreted broadly as pluralism; namely as the doctorine 
that-there is a plurarity of first principles to be weighed 
against one another by intuition.) 
can define the right independently of the good, and so 
match our moral sentiments. 
cannot show any constructive and recognizable ethical 
criteria; in case of moral conflicts it only tells us to rely on 
our each intuition.
  Morally, Rawls wants to preserve the priority of the right with intuitionists, 
but methodologically heis on utilitarian's ide. Intuitionism, failing to show 
any method, any priority rules for weighning conflicting principles, eems after 
all only to express one's moral conviction. 
  So, his problem is to construct asubstantial theory of justice without relying 
on intuitive principles, in other words, a theory of justice with rationally recog-
nizable criteria. At this point he finds a way out in the tradition of the social 
contract theory:
... What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a 
higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social 
contract as represented by Lock, Rousseau, and Kant ..... this 
theory seems to offer an alternative systematic account of justice 
that is superior, or so I argue, to the dominant utilitarianism of
the tradition.
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  The strategy Rawls adopts is to construct principles of justice as agreed on 
by self-interested rational persons who are situated in the contractarian i itial 
situation of choice. Rawls assigns quasi-formal constraints to this situation and 
persons o that any principles agreed on unanimously under such circumstances 
will be, by the very nature of the agreement, "just". For Rawls the theory of 
justice is "part of the theory of rational choice".
2. THE FORMULATION OF TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN 
"JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
  In JF, Rawls confines his concern with justice to the sense "only as a virtue 
of social institutions, or what I call practices". ®The word "practice" is defined 
here as "any form of activity specified by a system of rules which define offices, 
roles, moves, penalties, defences, and so on, and which give the activity its 
structure".® Questions of justice in this sense arise "when conflicting claims 
are made upon the design of a practice and where it is taken granted that each 
person will insist, as far as possible, on what he considers his rights".® Then 
the principles of justice are to be invoked "for formulating restrictions as to how 
practices may define positions and offices, and assign thereto powers and liabil-
ities, rights and duties". ® They deal with some aspects of distributive justice. 
  A practice is an institution or a system within a society. So, to show the 
process that leads to the two principles of justice, Rawls starts by assuming "a society of persons amongst whom a certain system of practices i  already 
established", and persons are also assumed tohave the following characteristics:
1) They are mutually self-interested; their allegiance to their practices i  
  founded on the prospect of self-advantage. 
2) They are rational; they know their own interests, and are capable of 
  tracing out the likely consequences of adopting one practice rather than 
 another. 
3) They are free from the fault of envy; the bare knowledge or perception 
  of the difference between their condition and that of others is not a 
  source of great dissatisfaction. 
4) They have roughly similar needs and interests; fruitful cooperation 
  among them is possible. They are also sufficientlyy equal in power and 
  ability; none is able to dominate others.
  Under these 
upon which his
circumstances, each person proposes by turns the principles 
complaints as well as those of others are to be tried, and by
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which he will be bound in future occasions. This procedure keeps going untill 
everyone is of one mind as to how complaints are to be judged, and thus ac-
knowledges a set of principles of general kind that should be applied impartial-
ly to each one's conduct and constitute constraints upon one's pursuit of inter-
ests. 
  The two principles of justice are settled on as the solution to the above 
bargaining situation. They are formulated in JF as follows:
First, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, 
has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with 
a like liberty for all, and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless 
it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's 
advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they 
attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all. These 
principles express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty, 
equality, and reward for services contributing to the common 
good.
  The first principles expresses "the initial position of equal liberty", the 
starting point of bargaining, and departing from which will always require a 
justification. However, the persons are always ready to move to more advanta-
geous positions because of their self-interestedness a conditioned above. So, if 
they find that a certain practice with an inequality may guarantee a higher 
level of benefit than the same practice without the inequality, it is reasonable 
for them to prefer unanimously the former to the latter. This necessiates the 
stipulation of the second principle. "The second principle defines what sorts 
of inequalities are permissible; it specifies how the presumption laid down by the 
first principle may be put aside".® An inequality here must be understood as 
meaning the difference in the rewards or burdens assigned by rules to roles 
and positions, not the difference yielded from the exploitation. 
  And the second principle holds that "an inequality is allowed only if there is 
reason to believe that the practice with the inequality, or resulting in it, will 
work for the advantage of every party" engaging in it". ®
 Now, from a brief view of the two principles above, we can say that the 
originality of Rawls's theory lies in his devising how to balance the egalitarian 
point of view with the claim for more efficient arrangement of social institutions 
and systems. Then, the second principle is the key of his theory.
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3. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FIRST FORMULATION IN JF
  There have been many criticisms and objections tothe formulation f two 
principles of justice in JF, most of which are focused on how to interpret the 
second principle. In this paper I will mention three of them that seem important 
to later development of Rawls's theory.
  1) How does the second principle relate to the first principle? The first 
principle concerns the equal liberty of persons in the initial situation, but, by' 
"liberty" what does Rawls mean? This point is not clear in JF . In view of the 
discussion on the priority of liberty in TJ, where he speaks of the basic liberties 
of citizens uch as freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, we can say 
that in JF also Rawls's "liberty" means uch political iberties as secured by 
modern democratic political systems. On the other hand, the, sEtbnd principle 
clearly concerns the distribution of economic advantage. Then, does it mean 
that the economic advantage might override the equal liberty or the basic civil 
rights? 
  2) How is the economic surplus which inequalities may yield to be dis-
tributed? Is any way of distribution, if it will work out for everyone's advan-
tage, just? The reason for introducing an inequality into a practice is that it can 
contribute to the better-off of all members. If so, there should be the economic 
surplus yielded from the inequality. Clearly there can be many ways of dis-
tributing it. For example, suppose a practice with five positions, filled by 
five persons, A-E. Now, 1,000 units of surplus income are gained by introducing 
an inequality, which assigns burdens and rewards to each position so that the 
practice would run most efficiently. Five persons are arguing how to distribute 
this surplus, and A proposes such a distribution plan as (A:956, B:1, C:1, D:1, 
E:1), B proposes (A:1, B:956, C:1, D:1, E:1), and so on. The second princi-
ple cannot solve this dispute, for it is indifferent among these plans o far as any 
proposed one may guarantee the minimum increase inincome of every position. 
But, the redistribution of social benefit is surely one of the most important 
subjects of justice.
  3) Would the second principle with the competitive interpretation of 
"open to all" clause be unanimously agreed on? Rawls comments in IF that 
"open to all" means "must be won in a fair competition". However, in IF, 
persons are assumed to have a good knowledge of talents and abilities of oneself 
and of the others. Each person can know the relative position to the others in 
competition. So, more talented persons will surely agree to the second principle, 
and the less talented will also surely reject it because they cannot have any pros-
pect of better-off position. Then the bargaining will come to a break down.
-35-
4. THE REVISED FORMULATION OF TWO PRINCIPLES IN 
   "A THEORY OF JUSTICE" 
  In response to questions uch as above cited, Rawls has made many theo-
retical modifications, alterations and qualifications which are summed up in 
the final formulation of twoo principles of justice in TJ: 
  First Principle 
    Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
    system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
    of liberty for all. 
  Second Principle 
    Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
    they are both: 
      (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
    with the just savings principle, and 
      (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under con-
    ditions of fair equality of opportunity. 0 
  Major points Rawls has elabolated answering to above three questions are as 
follows: 
  1) The meaning of "liberty" is made explicit as "a complex of rights and 
duties defined by institutions". It is a system of basic rights of citizens ecured 
by the concept of the rule of law. And Rawls gives priority to the equal 
liberty of citizenship over social and economic advantages; the two principles 
are arranged in "lexical order", that is, the first principle in the ordering must 
be satisfied before movingg on to the second, the second before the third, and 
so on. Therefore, "liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty". 
  2) Rawls admits the ambiguity of "for everyone's advantage" clause, 
and shows two interpretations of it; one is the principle of efficiency and the 
other is the difference principle. The principle of efficiency, which is simply 
the principle of Pareto optimality applied to the basic structure of society, 
holds that a distribution is efficient when there is no way to change it so as 
to make at least one person better off without making other persons worse off. 
But, as we have seen, there are many efficient distributions, and this principle 
cannot single out one of them as best. To remove this indeterminateness, 
Rawls chooses the least advantaged persons as a position from which social 
and economic inequalities are to be judged, and says: 
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    Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty 
    and fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those 
    better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme 
    which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of 
    society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and 
    secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so 
    is to the advantage of those less fortunate. 
  Rawls calls this interpretation the difference principle, as stipulates it as 
the second principle (a). The difference principle shows us more egalitarianistic 
approach to the distribution problem. 
  3) In TJ, Rawls sets aside the competitive interpretation of "open to all" 
clause, and qualifies it as meaning "fair equality of opportunity". But more 
important is his introducing the notion of "the veil of ignorance". This notion 
is an analytical devise to rule out the possibility of tailoring the principle to 
one's own particular contingencies. The persons in the original position are 
assumed to be behind the veil of ignorance:
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position 
or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. 
Nor again, does any one know his conception of the good, the particu-
lars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psy-
chology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessi-
mism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the 
particular circumstances of their own society .... The persons in the 
original position have no information as to which generation they 
belong .... ©z
  While thus lacking the knowledge about themselves and their stations, the 
persons are also assumed to know "the only particular facts that their society is 
subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies", plus the 
general facts that affect the choice of the principles of justice such as the princi-
ples of economic theory, the basis of social organization, the laws of human 
psychology, and so on. Under these limitations on knowledge, the persons 
ought to evaluate principles olely on the basis of generality. 
  However, if the persons have no knowledge about themselves, then they will 
not have any interests, desires and purposes, then there will not arise the ques-
tion of justice, for they lack the motivation for bargaining. At this point, Rawls
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introduces two notions; the notion of "the rational life plan" and that of "pri-
mary goods". 
  Rawls adapts J. Royce's thought that "a person may be regarded as a human 
life lived according to a plan", and develops his theory of goodness as rational-
ity:
The main idea is that a person's good is determined by what is for him 
the most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable 
circumstances. A man is happy when he is more or less'successfully in 
the way of carrying out his plan. To put it briefly, the good is the 
satisfaction of rational desire. r3
  Though plans may vary with one's abilities and circumstances, there are 
those things as would be preferred more of than less by a rational man whatever 
his life-plan may be. These are "primary goods". Primary goods are necessary 
means in carrying out one's life-plan. The persons in the original position don't 
know what their rational plans are in detail, but they know that they have their 
own rational life-plans, and also know that they prefer more social primary 
goods rather than less. 
  The social primary goods are, Rawls mentions, rights and liberties, oppor-
tunities and powers, income and wealth, and a sense of one's own worth. Posi-
tions and offices in systems of a society are to be evaluated in terms of expec-
tations of these social primary goods. 
  Rawls had to make one more important alteration by lowering the veil of 
ignorance; the scope of the principles of justice has shifted from practices 
to "the basic structure of society". This shift is necessary because a practice is 
an institution or a system within a society. Before designing a practice there 
must be an already established society. So, the persons cannot enter a practice 
without some amount of knowledge about themselves and their society. Behind 
the veil of ignorance they are obliged to restrict their concern to the most 
fundamental arrangement of society. A society is, according to Rawls, "a more 
or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations to one another 
recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in 
accordance with them" .(D The role of the principles of justice is to assign rights 
and duties to the basic structure of society.
5. FURTHER QUESTIONS
Now we have an outline of Rawls's two principles of justice in their full
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version. As we have seen, Rawls has devised new notions one after another to 
meet objections and criticisms. Of these notions, much-discussed and most 
problem-laden are the notion of the difference principle and that of the veil 
of ignorance. Here, I will take up these two notions to see what each of them 
has solved, and, on the other hand, what it newly poses.
  The Difference Principle 
  By introducing the difference principle, one can choose a system of society 
as "just"; single out the least advantaged person or group of a system of society, 
then compare his conditions of well-being with those of the least advantaged 
person of an alternative system of society, and see which of them is better off. 
  Besides this, the difference principle plus the notion of "primary goods" 
has another merit of avoiding difficulties of interpersonal comparisons of utility 
that have long troubled utilitarians. As long as the least advantaged person can 
be identified, the difference principle asks us only ordinal judgments of well-
being:
If we can decide whether a change in the basic structure makes him 
better or worse off, we can determine his best situation. We do not 
have to know how much he prefers one situation to another. The 
difference principle, then, asks less of our judgment of welfare. We 
never have to calculate a sum of advantages involving a cardinal mea-
sure. 9
  Still more, comparisons finding the least advantaged are made in terms 
of expectations of primary social goods, that is, "to compare men's situa-
tions solely by reference to things which it is assumed they all prefer more 
of". Thus, the notion of primary goods can establish a common objective 
measure in comparisons. 
  The difference principle, however, poses a serious problem; it has certain 
implications which contradict our intuitive judgment. Suppose two cases 
below:
There is a society with five members, A-E. (Each one's condition of 
well-being is indicated numerically.) Now, two plans of social re-
arrangement are proposed. 
                        Plan 1 
Present (A:11, 11:11, CAI, D:11, E:100) 
(A:50, B:40, C:30, D:20, E:10) 
                        Plan 2 
                        (A:100, B:100, C:100, D:100, E:9.9)
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    E is the least advantaged in the present system. On Plan I E is far 
     better off, but other four members are worse off though not worse 
     than E in the present system. On Plan 2 other four members than E aree 
    better off, but E is slightly worse off. 
  The difference principle should adopt Plan 1, and rule out Plan 2. It implies 
that any benefit o the least advantaged member can outweigh any loss to a 
better off member as long as it does not reduce the second below the first®, 
and it also implies that other members than the least advantaged cannot be 
better off unless the least advantaged member is better off. The total society 
will be dominated by the least advantaged member. These implications seem to 
be unacceptable. 
  The Veil of Ignorance 
  By lowering the veil of ignorance Rawls can force the persons in the original 
position to adopt he general point of view in choosing the principles. Rawls's 
original intention is to show that morally substantial principles can be reached 
through pursuing prudential reasoning with certain constraints. The veil of 
ignorance is a devise to attain this end; it adjusts the original position appropri-
ate to make judgment from "the moral point of view": 
    We want to define the original position so that we get the desired 
    solution. If a knowledge of particulars i allowed, then the outcome is 
    biased by arbitrary contingencies . . . . If the original position is to 
    yield agreements that are just, the parties must be fairly situated and 
     treated equally as moral persons. 
  Also, by denying to the persons any knowledge of their place in the distri-
bution of natural talents and abilities it shows us Rawls's view that talents 
and abilities are social, rather than personal, resources. 
  However, despite its attractiveness, we must say that this notion has compli-
cated the matter insolubly. On account of limited space I will itemize some 
crucial points: 
  (1) Rawls forbids the persons in the original position to have any knowledge 
of particular facts about themselves and their stations; no one knows who he is. 
Then, there cannot be any distinction between persons. Where can we seek for 
each one's identity? If so, why a contract or a bargaining be needed? Is there 
any difference between an impartial and rational legislator's designing a system 
of society and such abstract persons' assembly for agreement on that matter? 
  (2) Rawls assumes that the persons know the general facts about society 
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such as the principles of economic theory, and the laws of human psychology. 
The principles of justice must be applied to any society regardless of time or 
locality. General facts, the knowledge of which the persons are to have, also 
must be. But, no economics or no psychology has yet reached such a universal 
stage. Rather, by the very nature of empirical sciences, it is simply impossible; 
economics i  deeply embeded in the social system from which it has grown, 
for example. Those general facts which Rawls posits are nonexistent. 
  (3) Rawls introduces the notion of primary goods so that a bargaining 
under the veil of ignorance might be possible. Primary goods are those things 
which every rational man wants more of rather than less. But, how Rawls can 
identify primary goods? What a Bushman wants more of differs from what a 
citizen in Tokyo wants more of. By burying this difference in one's way of 
life under the veil of ignorance, and then by listing certain things as primary 
goods, doesn't Rawls force us a certain pattern of life or a certain type of man 
as a norm? Further, Rawls mentions rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, wealth and income and a sense of one's own worth as social primary 
goods. There are category differences between them. Rawls often speaks of 
"an index of primary goods", but, although wealth and income may be easily 
indexed, how are we to index a sense of one's own worth? They must be inte-
grated in order, but this poses as difficult a problem as that of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility.
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